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Russian Roulette: The Magnitsky Act’s 
Implications for U.S.-Russian Relations in an 
Increasingly Precarious Legislative Game 
 
HILLARY EVANS† 
 
         INTRODUCTION 
On December 28, 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed 
the controversial Dima Yakovlev bill1 into law, which the Duma had 
passed one week earlier.2 Formally entitled the “Federal Law On 
Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and 
Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation,” U.S. officials 
widely condemned the law for its banning of American adoptions of 
Russian children as well as halting those adoptions already in 
progress.3 However, the adoption bill was only part of a broader 
scheme of several measures directed against the United States, which 
 
† J.D., 2014, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; 
Executive Notes Editor, 2013-2014, Maryland Journal of International Law; B.A., 
2011, Vanderbilt University. The author wishes to thank the following people for 
their help during the two-year process of drafting this Note: Professor Michael Van 
Alstine for his thoughtful feedback and insightful guidance; her fellow editors for 
their invaluable comments; Drake Thompson for his pep talks and patience; and, as 
always, her parents, Bill and Bonnie Evans, for their unconditional love and 
support. 
1. See generally “Dima Yakovlev’ Bill in No One’s Best Interests, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/dima-yakovlev-
bill-no-one-s-best-interests-2012-12-20-0 (discussing the bill and its potential 
impact); Jim Heintz, Russia: Vladimir Putin Signs Bill Banning Americans from 
Adopting Russian Children, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2012, 12:19 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/28/russia-vladimir-putin-adoptions-
bill_n_2374291.html. 
2. A Law on Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of Russian Citizens Has Been Signed, PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
(Dec. 28, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4810. 
3. Gregory L. White, Putin Signs Adoption Ban, Putting Pending Cases in 
Limbo, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2012, at A8. 
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hint at a more political motivation for its creation. In fact, along with 
prohibiting American adoptions of Russian children, the bill that 
Putin signed on December 28, 2012 also prohibits “those [U.S. 
citizens] guilty of violating the fundamental human rights and 
freedoms of Russian citizens” from entering Russia, permits Russia 
to freeze their assets (financial or otherwise), and prohibits them from 
engaging in business transactions and owning property in Russia.4 
The bill does not only target private citizens; it also suspends “the 
activities of non-profit organizations that receive cash and other 
assets from American citizens (organizations), and are involved in 
political activities in Russia” and non-profit organizations 
“implementing projects, programmes, or conducting other activities 
in Russia that act as a threat to Russian interests.”5 Furthermore, the 
bill prohibits Russian citizens who are also U.S. nationals from being 
the leaders of “non-profit organization, or members or leaders of 
branches of international or foreign non-profit organizations involved 
in political activities in Russia.”6  
This language is essentially a tit-for-tat reaction to the United 
States’ Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei 
Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, more commonly 
known as the Magnitsky Act.7 The Magnitsky Act is a follow-up to 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,8 and is no less controversial or 
contentious than its predecessor, which was originally developed at 
the height of the Cold War to prohibit the granting of “most-favored-
nation” (MFN) status to countries that restricted emigration.9 In fact, 
both laws have managed to infuriate the Russian government in 
similar ways.10 Essentially, part of the Magnitsky Act requires the 
 
4. PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE, supra note 2. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of 
Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, 126 Stat. 1496; White, 
supra note 3 at A8. 
8. 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1974). For an explanation of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment, see infra Part II.A. 
9. Robert H. Brumley, Jackson-Vanik: Hard Facts, Bad Law?, 8 B.U. INT'L 
L.J. 363, 363 (1990). 
10. The Soviet Union furiously renounced the Amendment shortly after 
passage and viewed it as a flagrant interference in its domestic affairs, refusing to 
sign the 1972 trade agreement with the United States. Taunya L. McLarty, MFN 
Relations with Communist Countries: Is the Two-Decade Old System Working, or 
Should It Be Revised or Repealed?, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 153, 172 (1999); Keith 
Loken, Why Jackson-Vanik Should Be Abandoned, 16 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 
3, 6 (2007). Similarly, President Putin made it clear how he felt about the 
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President to submit to Congress a list of those who participated in the 
Magnitsky case or other human rights abuses.11 Those placed on the 
President’s list will be ineligible to receive a visa or will have their 
current visa revoked, as well as have their financial assets frozen.12 
As a result, the passing and signing of the Magnitsky Act by the 
U.S. government involves a broader range of implications than just 
soured Russo-American political relations. In this comment I will 
consider and analyze various implications resulting from the passage 
of the Magnitsky Act, including lessons learned from the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment; how this Act fits within the context of the rules 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO); and separation of powers 
concerns, specifically the ability of Congress to direct foreign affairs. 
To conclude I will discuss whether, in light of all the aforementioned 
implications, the Magnitsky Act will be more beneficial or 
detrimental as a rule of law. 
I.      BACKGROUND OF MAGNITSKY ACT  
 A brief overview of the background of the Magnitsky Act 
provides substantial insight as to why the Russian government would 
prefer it did not exist. Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian legal adviser 
to the foreign investment firm Hermitage Capital Management 
(HCM), who died at the age of 37 while in Russian police custody on 
November 16, 2009.13  
 
Magnitsky Act: by issuing an Executive Order directed towards the United States 
instructing Russia’s Foreign Ministry to “pursue . . . policy . . . based on the 
principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs . . .  [and] to work 
actively on preventing unilateral extraterritorial sanctions by the U.S. against 
Russian legal entities and individuals,” and by declaring the Magnitsky Act as 
“unfriendly . . . towards the Russian Federation.” PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA, 
EXECUTIVE ORDER ON MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT FOREIGN POLICY (May 7, 2012, 
6:20 PM), http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/3764; News Conference of Vladimir Putin, 
PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE (Dec. 20, 2012, 4:40 PM), 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4779#sel= 
33:1,33:10;34:40,34:60. 
11. § 404, 126 Stat. at 1505. 
12. Id. at §405. 
13. Special Rapporteur on Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Human Rights 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/30/Add.1 (May 19, 2011) (by Gabriela Knaul) 
[hereinafter Rep. of Special Rapporteur]. 
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HCM was the largest foreign investor in the Russian stock 
market and its Hermitage Fund was rumored to be the “world’s 
leading public equity fund focusing on the Russian market.”14 The 
company and its leadership were also known for their whistleblowing 
in regard to corruption in Russia.15 In 2007, Russia’s Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD) raided HCM’s Moscow office and the offices 
of its attorneys.16 HCM applied to the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York for assistance in conducting 
discovery for use in a foreign proceeding.17 In its declaration, HCM 
alleged that after investigation it had discovered several high-ranking 
Russian officials, businessmen, and private individuals comprising 
what it called a “criminal enterprise” that organized and perpetrated 
the raid on HCM.18 Among others, the declaration named as criminal 
senior officers within the MVD, including a Lieutenant Colonel and a 
Major; senior officers in the Federal Security Service (the successor 
to the KGB); senior officers in various Tax Bureaus; and several 
judges, including those of the St. Petersburg Arbitration Court.19 
Among businessmen, the declaration named senior executives of 
Russian commercial banks as well as its shareholders and directors.20 
A potential unspoken and risky implication in this declaration was 
that President Putin, who was President at the time, knew of or was 
potentially involved in this raid.  
HCM alleged that during the raid, MVD officers seized 
corporate records from both its Moscow office and the office of its 
 
14. Julia Lapitskaya, Note, ECHR, Russia, and Chechnya: Two Is Not 
Company and Three Is Definitely A Crowd, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 479, 516 
(2011); Konstantinos D. Magliveras, The Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability 
Act: An Extraterritorial Instrument With a Good Cause? 29 No. 3 INT'L 
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 68, 68 (2013). 
15. Clifford J. Levy, An Investment Gets Trapped in Kremlin’s Vise, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 24, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/24/world/europe/24kremlin.html 
?hp=&pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
16. Id.; Thomas Firestone, Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia, 42 INT'L 
LAW. 1207, 1213 (2008). 
17. Decl. of Neil Micklethwaite ¶¶ 3–4, 16–18, In re Application of Hermitage 
Capital Management Limited for Judicial Assistance to Conduct Discovery for Use 
in a Foreign Proceeding, No. M19-116 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://www.robertamsterdam.com/Hermitage%20Micklethwaite%20Declaration.pd
f [hereinafter Decl. of Neil Micklethwaite]. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. ¶ 6. 
20. Id. 
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law firm.21 HCM stated that the “criminal enterprise” then used to 
fraudulently re-register three of the Hermitage Fund’s investment 
companies from HSBC Private Bank, the original trustee of the 
Hermitage Fund, to certain members of its group.22 The effect of this 
re-registering was essentially to replace the HSBC executive directors 
with members of the “criminal enterprise,” each of whom had prior 
criminal convictions.23 
HCM then alleged that the “criminal enterprise” forged contracts 
that created approximately U.S. $1 billion worth of false financial 
liabilities against the company.24 These counterfeit contracts, dating 
from before the raid, would have been impossible to create without 
the sensitive documents seized by the MVD, yet were recognized by 
multiple judgments handed down by Russian courts.25 That same 
year, HCM, under its new, fraudulent directors, applied to tax 
authorities for a $230 million refund in overpaid taxes from the 
Russian government.26 The refund request was granted immediately 
and the government routed money through banks and to bank 
accounts that were affiliated with members of the alleged “criminal 
enterprise.”27 According to the HCM’s declaration,  
The fraudulent rebate of U.S. $230 million was 
authorized by Russian tax officials despite the fact that 
HSBC and Hermitage had filed comprehensive 
criminal complaints with Russian law enforcement 
authorities alerting them to the misappropriation of the 
Hermitage Companies, fabrication of fictitious 
liabilities against them, and the sham court judgments 
three weeks before the fraudulent tax refund request . . 
. .28 
 
21. Id. ¶ 7.  
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. ¶ 8. 
25. Id. ¶ 8. 
26. Lapitskaya, supra note 14, at 516. 
27. Decl. of Neil Micklethwaite, supra note 17, ¶ 9. 
28. Id. ¶ 10. 
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Soon thereafter, petitions were filed in Russian courts to 
“liquidate and bankrupt” HCM and its companies.29  
HCM’s executives and lawyers were not left untouched during 
this time period. Many of them, including HMC’s CEO William 
Browder, were intimidated in the form of criminal charges.30 
Browder, whose visa was cancelled in 2005, was declared a “threat to 
national security” by the Russian government and investigated for tax 
evasion.31 However, because he had stayed out of Russia since his 
 
29. Id. ¶ 11. What happened after these petitions were filed is more complex. 
In the words of HMC’s CEO William Browder,  
“After committing the tax rebate fraud, the criminal group then attempted 
to destroy the evidence by liquidating our stolen companies. They first 
sold the stolen companies to a British Virgin Islands company called Boily 
Systems, and then Boily applied to liquidate our stolen companies. Once 
we discovered the transfer to Boily, our lawyers wrote to Commonwealth 
Trust Company, the company-formation agent in the British Virgin 
Islands, to determine who stood behind Boily and what was going on. 
Unfortunately, Commonwealth Trust stonewalled us at every step of the 
way. . . . As we later learned, some of the $230 million found its way back 
to a Russian individual named Vladlen Stepanov, the ex-husband of the 
Russian tax official who authorized the illegal tax refund in 2007. In 2010, 
we found out that two companies that were owned by Stepanov received 
approximately €8 million into accounts at Credit Suisse Private Bank 
Zürich. It turns out that one of those companies was set up by 
Commonwealth Trust, and we also learned that Commonwealth Trust 
offered a written declaration to Credit Suisse that the company wasn’t 
involved in money laundering. . . . In terms of tracing the money, we have 
been able to trace $135 million out of the $230 million to eight different 
jurisdictions, and have written to the police and prosecutors in those 
countries. There are now six different countries that have criminal 
investigations opened into the money laundering: Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Switzerland and Moldova.”  
Mary Campbell, Q&A: Hermitage Capital Management Founder Takes on 
Russia’s Putin, FINALTERNATIVES (May 29, 2013, 12:52 PM), 
http://www.finalternatives.com//node/23784?time=1379609401 (emphasis 
omitted). 
30. Decl. of Neil Micklethwaite, supra note 17, ¶ 12. 
31. Id. ¶ 25. Putin claims to not know Browder exists or the reasons for his 
exile, stating: 
 “I don’t know who this Mr. Browder is, as you say, why he cannot return 
to Russia . . . . Russia is a big country . . . . There might have been some 
kind of conflicts—conflicts with the authorities, conflicts in the business 
world, interpersonal conflicts. But that’s life, it’s complicated and varied. 
If a person thinks that his rights have been violated, let him go to court. 
We have a legal system that works, thank God.” 
 Levy, supra note 15. 
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visa was revoked, Browder managed to avoid official charges.32 
Sergei Magnitsky was not so fortunate. 
In 2008, Magnitsky voluntarily testified in court against officials 
of the Russian Interior Ministry, accusing the officials of obtaining a 
fraudulent rebate of $230 million.33 One month later, on November 
24, 2008, Magnitsky was charged with tax evasion and arrested in 
Moscow.34 He was refused bail and a court date and was held in pre-
trial detention for eleven months.35 Although his lawyers filed 
complaints on his behalf for the arbitrary nature of his detention 
throughout this time period, their applications were all rejected.36 At 
some point during his detention, Magnitsky developed gallstones and 
acute pancreatitis, and he asserted that he was repeatedly denied 
medical treatment for these conditions.37 He also alleged harsh 
conditions inside the prison such as poor sanitation, social isolation, 
and lack of proper opportunities for defense by writing his complaints 
in a journal that was passed out by his lawyers every month.38 On 
November 16, 2009, eight guards allegedly beat Magnitsky with 
rubber batons, and denied him medical treatment for one hour and 
eighteen minutes until he was dead.39 Magnitsky died from heart 
failure less than a year after he was arrested.40 A request for an 
 
32. Henry Meyer, Russia to Charge Browder with Tax Evasion, May Seek 
Extradition, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 16, 2011, 7:14 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-16/russia-to-charge-william-browder-
with-tax-evasion-might-seek-extradition.html. 
33. Rep. of Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, ¶ 1013, at 168. 
34.  Id. ¶ 1014, at 168.  
35. Id.; Decl. of Neil Micklethwaite, supra note 17, ¶ 13, at 7. 
36. Rep. of Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, ¶ 1014, at 168. 
37. Id. ¶ 1014–15.  
38. William Browder, Tortured to Death by Putin’s Jackboot State: Inside the 
Rat-infested Gestapo-like Russian Prison Where Eight Guards Beat Lawyer Who 
Exposed Moscow’s Gangster Regime, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 11, 2012, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2227309/Tortured-death-Putins-jackboot-
state-Last-words-Moscow-lawyer-death-screams--chilling-truth-Russias-terrifying-
gangster-regime.html#axzz2KMB249Jz; see generally English Translation of 
Complaint by Sergey Magnitsky to General Prosecutor Yuru Chaika,  
http://russian-untouchables.com/docs/Prison-Diaries-Magnitsky-General-
Prosecutor-Complaint.pdf (English translation of Magnitsky’s complaint provided 
by his supporters).  
39. Rep. of Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, ¶ 1015, at 168. 
40. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of 
Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, § 402(a)(8), 126 Stat. 1496, 
1503. 
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independent autopsy was denied, and Magnitsky’s body was only 
released to the family on the condition that it be buried 
immediately.41  
There was a substantial and immediate public outcry after 
Magnitsky’s death. The Public Oversight Commission for Human 
Rights Observance in Moscow Detention Centers (POC) issued a 
report in December 2009 concluding that Russia wrongfully deprived 
Magnitsky of his right to life.42 Shortly after, President Medvedev 
declared that there would be a criminal investigation into 
Magnitsky’s death, and in July 2011, Medvedev’s Human Rights 
Council announced the results of its investigation.43 The Council 
found that Magnitsky’s “arrest and detention was illegal” among 
other things.44 At the time this paper was written, no criminal 
convictions have been made in connection to the death “despite the 
fact that the POC report concluded that a number of investigators and 
penitentiary officials, including the lead investigator in the criminal 
case against Mr. Magnitsky, should have been investigated as well.”45 
The United Nations has also issued several reports through its 
Commission on Torture and its Special Rapporteurs condemning 
 
41. Rep. of Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, ¶ 1015, at 168. 
42. The Pub. Oversight Comm’n for Human Rights Observance in Moscow 
Det. Centers, Review of the Conditions of the Detention of Sergei Magnitsky in the 
Pre-Trial Detention Centers of the City of Moscow, WALL ST. J. at 19, 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-20091229-
MagnitskyReport.pdf. 
43. § 402(a)(8), 126 Stat. at 1503. 
44. Id. 
45. Comm. against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic 
Rep. of the Russian Fed’n, Adopted by the Comm. at its Forty-Ninth Sess. (29 
October-23 November 2012), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/RUS/CO/5 (Dec. 11, 2012) 
[hereinafter Concluding Observations]. Although there were originally charges 
against the head doctor at the prison, Larisa Litivnova, those charges have since 
been dropped. § 402(a)(8), 126 Stat. at 1503. Curiously enough, Russia 
posthumously retried Magnitsky and his co-defendant Browder for tax evasion, a 
stunt hearkening back to the Stalinist era of in absentia trials. David M. 
Herszenhorn, Dead Lawyer, a Kremlin Critic, Is Found Guilty of Tax Evasion, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 12, 2013, at A4. Although officials claimed the trial was to help 
Magnitsky’s supporters clear his name, relatives say they did not ask for a retrial, 
and many predicted that the trial would serve to vindicate those Magnitsky and 
Browder accused of corruption. Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Plans to Retry Dead 
Lawyer in Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, at A4. They were right. On July 11, 
2013, Sergei Magnitsky was found guilty of tax evasion, almost four years after his 
death. Herszenhorn, supra note 45. Browder was sentenced to nine years in prison. 
Id. 
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Magnitsky’s death and calling for stricter investigations and 
adherence to international treaties and norms.46  
Individual countries have also taken action against Russia and 
those involved in Magnitsky’s death.47 Several parliaments including 
those in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Poland, 
have passed resolutions “urging their governments to introduce 
sanctions on the Magnitsky case,” while other parliaments such as 
those in Portugal, France, Spain, and Latvia, are drafting similar 
resolutions.48 In response to these resolutions of EU member states, 
in October 2012 the European Parliament adopted recommendations 
to the European Council to establish “a common EU list of officials 
responsible for the death of Sergei Magnitsky,” to ban these officials 
from the EU, and to freeze financial assets “they or their family may 
hold” in the EU.49 
These recommendations are echoed in the text of United States’ 
Magnitsky Act. This Act, introduced in the House of Representative 
by Representative Dave Camp in July 2012, became Public Law 112-
208 when signed by President Obama on December 14, 2012.50 The 
purpose of the Act is “[t]o authorize the extension of 
nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment) to 
products of the Russian Federation . . . and to require reports on the 
compliance of the Russian Federation with its obligations as a 
member of the World Trade Organization, and for other purposes.”51  
The Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei 
Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 is divided into 
 
46. Concluding Observations, supra note 45, at 2, ¶ 5; Rep. of Special 
Rapporteur, supra note 13, at 167–68. 
47. Common Visa Restrictions for Russian Officials Involved in the Sergei 
Magnitsky Case, EUR. PARL. DOC. (P7_TA-PROV 0369) 79–81 (2012). 
48. Id. at 80. 
49. Id.; Magliveras, supra note 14, at 69. The EU is still considering whether 
to pass such a law. Dmitry Zhdannikov & Darya Korsunskaya, Russian Tycoons 
Concerned as Magnitsky Fallout Spreads, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/25/us-davos-russia-magnitsky-
idUSBRE90O0RA20130125. 
50. See supra note 7; H.R. Res. 6156, 112th Cong. (2012) (enacted); Stephen 
Collinson, Obama Signs Russia Rights Law Despite Putin Fury, AFP (Dec. 14, 
2012), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ifTJR_NiuSC0kkG 
DgBkKJjDDYSqQ?docId=CNG.1a7e217111e4906ef1b6b3e54e79e1b0.141. 
51. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of 
Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, 126 Stat. 1496, 1496.  
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several titles. Title I of the Act repeals the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment, also known as title IV of the Trade Act of 1975, due to 
Russia’s becoming a member of the WTO.52 Title II, section 201 
requires reports on Russia from the United States Trade 
Representative on how the country is implementing its obligations as 
a member of the WTO.53 If the Trade Representative believes Russia 
is not honoring its obligations, he is then required to present a report 
on the actions he plans to take and those he has taken to “encourage 
the Russian Federation to improve its implementation of the 
agreement.”54 Section 202 of the Act requires the Trade 
Representative and the Secretary of State to submit a report on 
measures taken and results achieved during the year preceding the 
submission with respect to promoting the rule of law in Russia, 
including “strengthening formal protections for United States 
investors in the Russian Federation,” and “advocating for United 
States investors in the Russian Federation” among other things.55 
This section also requires the Secretary of Commerce to set up a 
phone line and website to allow United States entities inside and 
outside Russia to report instances of bribery and corruption, to submit 
reports detailing the number of instances where bribery or corruption 
has occurred, and report on actions taken by the Secretary of 
Commerce to help those that have reported bribery or corruption.56  
Title IV introduces the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law 
Accountability Act.57 In Section 402 of this title, Congress lists its 
findings in regard to multiple human rights abuses in Russia and 
discusses Magnitsky’s case in detail.58 The section then goes on to 
explain why Magnitsky’s prosecution was “politically motivated,” 
and concludes by claiming that the “Russian Government’s 
suppression of dissent and political opposition, the limitations it has 
imposed on civil society and independent media, and the 
deterioration of economic and political freedom inside Russia are of 
 
52. Id. § 102. 
53. Id. § 201. 
54. Id.  
55. Id. § 202. 
56. Id.  
57. Id. § 401. 
58. Id. § 402. Besides Magnitsky’s case, this section also discusses the 
detention of Mikhail Khodorkovsky as well as multiple unsolved murders of 
Russian journalists. Id. 
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profound concern to the United States Government and the American 
people.”59  
The Magnitsky Act also includes significant provisions that set 
up the potential for foreign affairs conflicts between the President and 
Congress. In section 404, Congress requires the President to submit a 
list of “persons responsible for the detention, abuse or death of Sergei 
Magnitsky, participated in efforts to conceal the legal liability for the 
detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky, financially benefitted 
from the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky, or [were] 
involved in the criminal conspiracy uncovered by Sergei Magnitsky” 
and well as other violators of human rights.60 Sections 405 and 406 
then detail the consequences of being on the President’s list.61 In 
section 405, those people that are on the President’s list are ineligible 
to receive visas to the United States, and the Secretary of State will 
revoke the visas of those that already have them.62 In section 406, the 
Act gives the President power under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act to “freeze and prohibit all transactions in all 
property and interests in property of a person who is on the list . . . if 
such property and interests in property come within the United States 
. . . .”63 The Act ends with section 407, which orders the Secretary of 
State and the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report on their 
actions taken to carry out Title IV of the Act, and efforts by the 
executive branch to encourage the governments of other countries to 
impose sanctions on Russia such as those found Title IV.64  
On April 12, 2013, the Obama Administration released a list of 
18 individuals who would be sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act.65 
 
59. Id. 
60. Id. § 404. 
61. Id. §§ 405–06. 
62. Id. § 405. 
63. Id. § 406(a)(1). 
64. Id. § 407. 
65. Listing Update, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Magnitsky Sanctions Listings 
(Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/Pages/20130412.aspx. These individuals include: Letscha Bogatirov, 
Aleksey Droganov, Kazbek Dukuzov, Pavel Karpov, Yelena Khimina, Dmitriy 
Komnov, Aleksey Krivoruchko, Artem Kuznetsov, Oleg Logunov, Andrey 
Pechegin, Sergei Podoprigorov, Ivan Prokopenko, Oleg Silchenko, Yelena 
Stashina, Olga Stepanova, Dmitri Tolchinskiy, Svetlana Ukhnalyova, and Natalya 
Vinogradova. Id. 
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Of these 18 people, 16 were involved with the Magnitsky case.66 
Although the list contained tax officials and district court judges 
among others, noticeably absent from the list were more senior 
officials in Putin’s administration who were involved with 
Magnitsky’s prosecution.67 U.S. Representative James McGovern 
even called the list “timid,” with “more significant omissions than 
names.”68 Although members of Congress have called for more 
Russians to be added to the list, U.S. officials did state that “the 
Obama administration had also chosen to deny visas to other Russian 
officials but kept their names in a classified annex,” as allowed by the 
Act, perhaps alluding to higher-level officials.69 Unsurprisingly, 
Russia retaliated with its own list of 18 Americans banned from the 
country, including former President George W. Bush and former 
Vice President Dick Cheney.70 
After its controversial and sensitive history, it is reasonable to 
expect that the Magnitsky Act will have wide-reaching implications 
not only on Russian-American relations, but also on foreign policy 
between nations. 
II.     IMPLICATIONS 
 Although the implications of such a controversial act are 
numerous, this paper will only focus on three specific areas 
concerning trade and the power of Congress to declare foreign 
policy.71 First, Part A will discuss lessons learned from the history of 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and how those lessons have 
impacted Russian-American relations as well as Russia’s reception of 
 
66. Richard Solash, U.S. Targets 18 Individuals on ‘Magnitsky List,’ RADIO 
FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.rferl.org/content/united-
states-publishes-magnitsky-list-russia/24956249.html. 
67. Jim Heintz, Russia Responds to U.S. Magnitsky Act By Placing 18 
Americans On Blacklist, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 13, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/13/russia-responds-to-us-
mag_n_3075795.html 
68. Solash, supra note 66. 
69. Id. 
70. Steve Gutterman, Russian Bans 18 Americans in Retaliation for Magnitsky 
List, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/13/us-
russia-usa-rights-idUSBRE93B0PU20130413. 
71. There are numerous implications to be discussed within the context of 
human rights, the Magnitsky Act, and the impact it will have on international 
human rights policies in general. Unfortunately, these implications are so numerous 
that they would require their own paper. As a result, the author has purposefully 
left out any substantial discussion of human rights implications as they relate to the 
Magnitsky Act. 
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the Magnitsky Act. Part B will address the relationship between the 
Magnitsky Act and the WTO, including the implications of the 
United States’ creating legislation that strongly encourages Russia to 
honor its international trade obligations. Finally, Part C will discuss 
separation of powers concerns with regard to the Magnitsky Act and 
more specifically the ability of Congress to direct foreign affairs.  
A.    The Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
The volatile history of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment has 
implications for not only Russia’s reception of the Magnitsky Act, 
but also its long-term effectiveness. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 was originally included at the 
height of the Cold War to prohibit the granting of “most-favored-
nation” (MFN) status to countries that restrict emigration.72 More 
specifically,  
[i]f a country denies its citizens the right or 
opportunity to emigrate, imposes more than a nominal 
tax on emigration or emigration documents, or 
imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or 
other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the 
desire of such a citizen to emigrate, then that country 
is ineligible under U.S. law for MFN treatment.73 
Although in 1972 President Nixon began the process of 
negotiating with the Soviet Union on a bilateral trade agreement that 
would grant MFN status to the country, negotiations were derailed 
shortly after the Soviet Union imposed an exit tax on those trying to 
emigrate, costing as much as 40,000 rubles for scientists and their 
families.74 The Jewish community in the United States perceived this 
as a tax against Soviet Jews and began campaigning against it, 
leading several Congress members including Senator Henry Jackson 
and Representative Charles Vanik to come up with the idea of linking 
trade and emigration together in a policy that would discourage the 
Soviet Union from restricting Jewish emigration and encourage the 
lifting of such restrictions.75 As a result, the Jackson-Vanik 
 
72. Brumley, supra note 9, at 363. 
73. Kevin M. Cowan, Cold War Trade Statutes: Is Jackson-Vanik Still 
Relevant?, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 737, 742 (1994). 
74. Brumley, supra note 9, at 365. 
75. Id.; Cowan, supra note 73, at 742. 
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Amendment was born, voted into law, and remained law until 
repealed by the Magnitsky Act.  
 Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union furiously renounced the 
Amendment shortly after passage and viewed it as a flagrant 
interference in their domestic affairs.76 The most immediate 
consequence of Russia’s anger was that it refused to sign the 1972 
trade agreement with the United States.77 One potential implication of 
this was that the United States had potentially hurt its own economic 
interests as a result of the Amendment.78 This belief might have had 
some credence—the United States did not sign another 
comprehensive trade agreement with Russia until 1990.79 
Furthermore, it is unclear as to whether the Amendment actually 
ended up promoting Jewish emigration or not.80 Although some 
believe that the Amendment provided “key leverage” in persuading 
the Soviet Union to loosen its emigration policies, others believe that 
several different factors and pressures independent of the 
Amendment occurred during this time period, potentially contributing 
to an increase in Jewish emigration.81 Either way, by 1990 the 
number of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union had substantially 
increased and continued to remain high through the decade.82 
 The reaction of the Soviet Union to the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment lends insight into why the Russian government 
responded so angrily to the Magnitsky Act and how it will continue 
to respond in the future. As made clear in the 1970’s, Russia does not 
appreciate other countries’ meddling in its foreign affairs. This was 
emphasized on May 7, 2012 when President Putin, having just been 
inaugurated, issued an Executive Order towards the United States 
instructing his Foreign Ministry “to pursue the policy of ensuring a 
stable and predictable cooperation based on the principles of equality, 
non-interference in internal affairs and respect for mutual interests . . 
.  [and] to work actively on preventing unilateral extraterritorial 
sanctions by the U.S. against Russian legal entities and 
 
76. McLarty, supra note 10, at 172. 
77. Keith Loken, Why Jackson-Vanik Should Be Abandoned, 16 CURRENTS: 
INT'L TRADE L.J. 3, 6 (2007).  
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
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individuals.”83 Although the Magnitsky Act had not yet been passed, 
several versions of it had been introduced to the House, leaving no 
doubt as to what Putin meant.84 This sentiment was echoed again in 
Putin’s news conference on December 20, 2012, when he pointedly 
stated, “This is undoubtedly an unfriendly act towards the Russian 
Federation. . . . [T]he issue here has nothing to do with officials. It’s a 
matter of one anti-Soviet, anti-Russian law being replaced with 
another. . . . [W]e [understand] it as U.S. lawmakers making it clear 
to us who’s the boss here, and keeping a certain level of tension. If 
Magnitsky did not exist, they’d have found another pretext.”85 
Another retaliatory, almost spiteful, measure Russia took was to retry 
Sergei Magnitsky and William Browder for tax fraud, posthumously 
and in absentia respectively, as if to demonstrate Putin’s contempt for 
the U.S. legislation that held those responsible for Magnitsky’s 
detention accountable.86 Finally, as stated previously, on December 
28, 2012 Putin passed the “Federal Law On Sanctions for Individuals 
Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens 
of the Russian Federation,” or the Dima Yakovlev bill, imposing a 
wide range of sanctions against United States citizens, non-profit 
organizations, and even those citizens wishing to adopt a Russian 
child.87 
 Because Russia has responded so negatively to the passing of the 
Magnitsky Act, it is plausible that the Act could have the same 
immediate implications as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment did in 
1974. First, negotiations, agreements, and treaties could be impeded, 
if not halted altogether. Certainly there will be a tension involved that 
has been created due to the Magnitsky case. This tension has already 
manifested in recent and escalating events such as the Edward 
 
83. Executive Order on Measures to Implement Foreign Policy, PRESIDENTIAL 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE (May 7, 2012, 6:20 PM), http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/3764. 
84. See e.g., Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, H.R. 
4405, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/ 
bdquery/z?d112:HR04405:@@@X|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=112 (a 
version introduced to the House). 
85. News Conference of Vladimir Putin, PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
(Dec. 20, 2012, 4:40 PM), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4779#sel=33:1,33:10 
;34:40,34:60. 
86. S. Adam Cardais, Ioana Caloianu & Molly Jane Zuckerman, Magnitsky 
Convicted of Tax Fraud, Karadzic Genocide Charge Reinstated, DOW JONES 
FACTIVA (July 12, 2013), http://www.tol.org/client/article/23861-magnitsky-
convicted-of-tax-fraud-karadzic-genocide-charge-reinstated.html. 
87. PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE, supra note 2. 
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Snowden incident,88 the crisis in Syria,89 cancelled bilateral 
negotiations between Presidents Obama and Putin,90 and Putin’s op-
ed in the New York Times.91 Because both Obama and Putin have 
stated that they intend to work together to seek further reductions in 
each country’s respective nuclear weapons, these talks could also 
potentially feel the ill effects of resentment resulting from the passage 
of the Magnitsky Act.92 As a result, the adversarial, retaliatory nature 
 
88. Alastair Jamieson, Obama Faces Showdown with Putin at G-20 Summit 
Over Syria, NBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013, 11:59 AM), 
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/09/05/20336921-obama-faces-
showdown-with-putin-at-g-20-summit-over-syria?lite. In August 2013, Russian 
officials granted temporary asylum to Snowden, who had leaked classified 
information from the NSA and consequently fled the United States, in spite of 
appeals from the White House requesting Russia return Snowden to the U.S. to face 
justice. Id.; Press Briefing, Press Sec’y Jay Carney, The White House (July 12, 
2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/12/press-
briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-7122013. 
89. Jamieson supra note 88. The tension between the United States and Russia, 
an ally of the Assad regime, over the escalating Syrian civil war, which has left 
over one hundred thousand Syrians dead and over two million refugees, reached a 
fever pitch after an August 21, 2013 chemical weapons attack that killed hundreds 
of people, including women and children. Id.; Deaths, Refugees, and Damage: 
Syria’s Crisis in Figures, YAHOO NEWS (Sept. 4, 2013), 
http://news.yahoo.com/deaths-refugees-damage-syrias-crisis-figures-
161611459.html; Rick Gladstone & Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Leader Admits 
Failure to Halt Syrian Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2013, at A13. 
90. Jessica Yellin, Jake Topper & Tom Cohen, Obama Cancels Talks with 
Putin Ahead of G-20 Summit, CNN (Aug. 8, 2013, 6:38 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/07/politics/obama-putin/index.html. This author also 
recently had the opportunity to view a bilateral discussion between a Russian 
minister and a United States government agency, post-Snowden. Although the 
discussion did not involve the contentious topic of Snowden, there was palpable 
tension between countries at points throughout the day. 
91. Vladimir Putin, A Plea for Caution from Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 
2013, at A31. Putin’s op-ed was met by much criticism from U.S. politicians 
(including a rebuttal op-ed by Senator McCain) for its condemnation of American 
“exceptionalism.” Thomas Grove, Senator McCain Attacks Putin on Russian 
Website, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/19/us-
russia-usa-mccain-idUSBRE98I0AB20130919; Jethro Mullen, Vladimir Putin’s 
Comments on American Exceptionalism, Syria Cause a Fuss, CNN (Sept. 12, 
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/12/politics/putin-syria-editorial-reaction/ 
index.html. 
92. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Speech (Feb. 12, 2013), 
available at http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/state-of-the-union-2013-
president-barack-obamas-speech-transcript-text-87550.html. 
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of recent legislation and political maneuvers indicate that a return to 
Cold War rhetoric and behavior is certainly possible.93 
 Other lessons from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment indicate that 
the future of the Magnitsky Act looks shaky. Due to Putin’s retrial of 
Magnitsky instead of trying those responsible for his death as well as 
his passage of sanctions against United States citizens, it appears that 
any progress hoped for by the United States as well as other 
international organizations in regard to justice for the abuse and death 
of Magnitsky is unlikely. If the status quo is maintained, the 
Magnitsky bill will potentially continue to be a point of tension and 
aggravation in U.S.-Russian relations, just as the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment was.94 Before the Amendment was repealed, officials in 
Russia “complained that Russia remain[ed] under the shadow of 
Jackson-Vanik,” a sentiment that is likely to resurface again 
depending on the length of time this Act is in effect.95 If this Act does 
not produce the results desired and continues to increase tension 
between Russia and the United States, the resentment incurred could 
undermine U.S.-Russian relations for years to come, possibly leading 
to calls for its repeal. 
B.    The Magnitsky Act and the WTO 
The Magnitsky Act ultimately repealed the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment, a law that made certain countries’ normal trade relations 
(NTR) status conditional, because it was incompatible with Russia’s 
recent accession to the WTO.96 Article I of one of the governing 
documents of the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), prevents member countries from discriminating against 
other member countries, and requires all member states to treat each 
other equally, stating, 
 
93. See, e.g., David Francis, Putin Just Took the Iron Curtain Out of 
Mothballs, FISCAL TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/ 
2013/08/08/Putin-Just-Took-the-Iron-Curtain-Out-of-Mothballs (explaining how 
Putin has violently quashed dissent using methods similar to those used in Soviet 
Russia). 
94. Loken, supra note 77, at 7. 
95. Id. 
96. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of 
Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, 126 Stat. 1496; Loken, 
supra note 77, at 7. 
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With respect to customs duties and charges of any 
kind imposed on or in connection with importation or 
exportation or imposed on the international transfer of 
payments for imports or exports, and with respect to 
the method of levying such duties and charges, and 
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection 
with importation and exportation, and with respect to 
all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 
III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall 
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the 
like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties.97  
Because Russia became a member of the WTO on August 22, 
2012, the United States was expected to extend unconditional 
MFN/NTR status to Russia as is required under GATT and the WTO 
Agreement.98  
The Magnitsky Act makes it clear that one of its main purposes 
and a condition of its repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is to 
ensure that Russia complies with its obligations under the WTO.  The 
first sentence of the Act declares an important purpose to be to 
“require reports on the compliance of the Russian Federation with its 
obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization.”99 This 
language points to important implications in the context of the 
relationship between Russia and the United States under the WTO 
Agreement.  
The first implication is that the Magnitsky Act is designed to set 
up a foundation for the United States to make claims against and 
potentially challenge Russia in the WTO. By requiring the United 
States Trade Representative to submit reports to Congress on the 
 
97. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
98. Accessions: Russian Federation, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2013), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm; Loken, supra note 
77, at 7. Although members of the WTO agreed to extend MFN/NTR status to all 
other members, if a WTO member decides it cannot comply with this obligation, it 
can invoke the non-application provision of the WTO Agreement. H.R. REP. NO. 
112-632, pt. 1, at 4 (2012). However, Congress determined that it would be the 
most beneficial to the United States economy to extend MFN status to Russia so as 
to reap the benefits of Russia’s concessions as a new member state of the WTO. Id. 
99. 126 Stat. at 1496. 
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extent to which Russia is implementing the WTO Agreement and its 
annexed agreements, Congress is ensuring that, should the need arise, 
the United States is immediately prepared to file a dispute in the 
WTO.100 Furthermore, the Magnitsky Act mandates that if the Trade 
Representative finds that Russia is not fully implementing the WTO 
agreements, he is to include in the report the actions he plans to take 
to encourage Russia to improve its implementation.101 These actions 
most likely will include addressing the issue to the WTO in the form 
of filing a dispute claim, because the Trade Representative deals with 
the WTO on a regular basis. In this way, the Magnitsky Act ensures 
that the process of a WTO challenge against Russia is already set in 
motion as soon as the Trade Representative files a report. The Trade 
Representative must also file a separate report describing the 
“enforcement actions” he has taken “to ensure the full compliance of 
the Russian Federation with its obligations as a member of the World 
Trade Organization.”102 Although this appears similar to the previous 
requirement of reporting on his plans to encourage Russia, this part of 
the Act conveys a stricter tone, indicating that the Trade 
Representative and the United States must take actions to ensure 
Russia’s compliance with the WTO. This raises even more questions 
as to whether it is the duty of the United States to take it upon itself to 
ensure Russia’s compliance with the WTO, outside of filing disputes 
with the WTO and solving those disputes within the organization, 
and whether it is a violation of any WTO agreement for the United 
States to do so. 
These questions indicate that the United States, through the 
Magnitsky Act, could potentially undermine the dispute settlement 
system of the WTO by taking action against Russia if it finds Russia 
to be unsuccessfully implementing its obligations as a member of the 
WTO. In the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Concerning the 
Settlement of Disputes agreement of the WTO, it is stated that “[t]he 
dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system.”103  Furthermore, “WTO members have agreed that if they 
 
100. Id. § 201. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 402 [hereinafter DSU]. 
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believe fellow-members are violating trade rules, they will use the 
multilateral system of settling disputes instead of taking action 
unilaterally.”104 According to Article 23 of that same agreement, 
When Members seek redress of a violation of 
obligations or other nullification or impairment of 
benefits under the covered agreements or an 
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the 
covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and 
abide by, the rules and procedures of this 
Understanding. In such cases, Members shall: (a) not 
make a determination to the effect that a violation has 
occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired 
or that the attainment of any objective of the covered 
agreements have been impeded, except through 
recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the 
rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall 
make any such determination consistent with the 
findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body 
report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award 
rendered under this Understanding . . . .105 
This Article appears to indicate that nations should not take it 
upon themselves outside of the dispute settlement system of the WTO 
to make any findings as to whether another nation is in compliance 
with any WTO agreement, or to ensure that one nation is complying 
with the Agreement. The Magnitsky Act explicitly tells the Trade 
Representative to make such a finding, present it to Congress, and 
then to take actions to ensure compliance based on the assumption 
that Russia has been violating its obligations as a member of the 
WTO. On its face, this order seems to defy the provisions to solve 
WTO disputes multilaterally, not unilaterally, as well as to make 
determinations of compliance only in accordance with the dispute 
settlement process. Furthermore, this creates the impression that not 
only does the United States flout the dispute settlement rules of the 
WTO, it also takes on the responsibilities of an international 
organization by meddling in the business of other countries at the 
expense of violating its own international obligations. 
 
 
 
104. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, 55, (3d ed. 2005). 
105. DSU art. 23. 
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C. Separation of Powers Concerns 
Whenever both the legislative and the executive branch are 
involved in creating foreign policy, separations of powers concerns 
arise. However, there is not one single source that clearly defines the 
doctrine of separation of powers. As such, several sources, such as 
the Constitution, scholarly writing, and case law must be read 
together in order to effectively discuss how the doctrine operates 
within the context of the Magnitsky Act. 
1.     Interpreting the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
There is no explicit definition of separation of powers within the 
Constitution. However, the doctrine was derived from Articles I, II, 
and III of the Constitution, which set forth the rights and duties of 
Congress, the President, and the Judiciary, respectively. Specifically, 
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution states,  “All legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States….”106 Likewise, Article II, Section 1 states, “The executive 
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.”107 This language indicates that each branch of government 
has its own powers and that these powers shall vest in that particular 
branch of government and nowhere else.  
In order to clear up some of the confusion as to which 
constitutional powers belong to whom, different scholars and judges 
have elaborated upon the powers given to the President versus the 
powers given to Congress. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
clearly sets out the legislative branch’s power to direct foreign policy, 
stating that it has the powers to  “regulate Commerce with foreign 
nations,” and to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and 
Excises,” among other things.108 According to Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in Zivotofsky v. Clinton as well as the majority opinion 
in Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, this power to regulate 
foreign commerce also includes the right to “regulate the entry of 
persons into this country.”109 Essentially, Article I “gives Congress 
 
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, §1. 
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 1. 
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. 
109. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1436 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring); Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270–71 
(1875). 
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almost all the enumerated powers over foreign affairs, and [A]rticle II 
gives the President almost none of them.”110  
As a result, the powers given to the President by the Constitution 
are not as clear-cut as those given to Congress. In fact, “[c]onsidered 
only for affirmative grants of power, the president’s Article II 
authority would appear to be quite limited.”111 However, although the 
presidential powers are not as explicitly defined as the legislative 
powers found in Article I, the President still has broad foreign affairs 
powers. More specifically, the President has  “powers to create 
international obligations for the United States in his capacity as the 
nation’s ‘constitutional representative’ in foreign affairs.”112 As 
American Jurisprudence states, “Foreign policy is the province and 
responsibility of the executive, and the conduct of foreign affairs is 
exclusively vested in the executive branch although it is also said that 
the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States is committed 
by the Constitution to the executive and the legislative—the 
political—departments of the government.”113 The President has the 
undefined power to recognize a foreign government, as well as the 
powers to negotiate international agreements, respond to foreign 
events as spokesperson, initiate United States policy, represent the 
United States at international organizations, waive obligations made 
by other countries to the United States, interpret treaties in the first 
instance, withdraw the United States from treaties, and authorize the 
use of force abroad in pursuit of United States’ interests.114    
Despite the limited amount of enumerated presidential powers 
found in the Constitution, Presidents have generally had an expansive 
view of their foreign affairs powers, and have “aggressively resisted 
congressional encroachment on their perceived prerogatives,” which 
has been reflected in case law.115 Justice Sutherland illustrated this 
view in his opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corporation, when he quoted John Marshall’s speech to the House of 
 
110. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign 
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1292 (1988). 
111. Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs 
Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 311 (2006). 
112. Id. at 316.  
113. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 252 (2013). 
114. Id.; Richard F. Grimmett, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and 
Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 1, 1999), http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm; Jean 
Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 987, 1002 (2013).  
115. Galbraith, supra note 114, at 1002.  
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Representatives: “‘the President is the sole organ of the nation in its 
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign 
nations.’”116 Moreover, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer,117 although the Court ultimately decided that President 
Truman’s actions exceeded his constitutional authority when he 
issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to 
take possession of and operate most of the country’s steel mills,118 the 
concurrences of several justices indicated that a President’s power is 
not limited to the powers expressly granted in Article II. As Justice 
Jackson stated in his concurrence, “Presidential powers are not fixed 
but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with 
those of Congress.”119  Ultimately, Justice Jackson’s concurrence had 
a profound effect on separation of powers jurisprudence, as 
demonstrated in Dames & Moore v. Regan,120 where the Court 
explicitly used the concurrence to uphold President Carter’s 
executive orders concerning Iran during the Iranian hostage crisis.121 
When courts do have to get involved in separation of powers 
issues, they tend to defer to past practice in order to make their 
decision.122 Youngstown is also important because Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion articulated the importance of 
historical practice as a part of interpreting presidential power when he 
said, “In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long 
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold 
the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the 
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive 
Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”123 In this way, 
presidential powers have increased over time as reliance on past 
practice has validated whatever particular power the President is 
 
116. 299. U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
117. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
118. Id. at 582, 587. 
119. Id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
120. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
121. Id. at 668–69. 
122. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical 
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM L. REV. 1097, 1098–99 (2013).  
123. Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
610–11 (1952)). 
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attempting to assert.124 By considering the presence or absence of 
past practice in resolving separation of powers disputes, theoretically 
either the President or Congress can come out ahead.125 However, 
“past practice has furthered gradual accretions of presidential power 
because the President, as a unitary actor unhindered by the collective 
action challenges that constrain Congress, has both the incentives and 
the abilities to push the boundaries repeatedly.”126 As such, the 
executive branch tends to come out ahead. 
2.    Separation of Powers Concerns Within the Magnitsky Act 
Because there is no explicit separation of powers between the 
President and Congress, it is unclear how a court would rule should 
such a challenge arise from the Magnitsky Act. By analyzing 
language within the Magnitsky Act that may implicate the separation 
of powers doctrine, I hope to not only identify specific provisions that 
could potentially raise separation of powers concerns, but also to 
discuss provisions that could result in serious conflict between the 
executive and legislative branches. I will first address provisions of 
lesser concern that are still worth mentioning, and then I will discuss 
a provision of greater concern. 
a.      Provisions Of Lesser Concern 
The provisions of lesser concern within the Magnitsky Act that 
may implicate the separation of powers doctrine deal less with the 
President and more with those in his cabinet and the greater executive 
branch of government. The first area of concern is where Congress 
orders the Trade Representative to issue a report on enforcement 
actions he has taken to “ensure the full compliance” of the Russian 
Federation to the obligations of the WTO.127 Although Congress does 
not directly order a member of President Obama’s cabinet to take 
action against Russia, this provision implies that the executive branch 
must take some sort of enforcement action if and when Russia does 
not abide by the WTO rules. Some might see this provision as 
trespassing on the executive branch’s territory by telling it what 
 
124. An illustration of this is the President’s issuance of a constitutional 
signing statement when signing a bill into law. Id. at 1107. This could indicate that 
the President is attempting “to prevent historical gloss from developing in a way 
that might limit presidential authority.” Id. at 1108. 
125. Galbraith, supra note 114, at 1004. 
126. Id. 
127. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of 
Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, § 201(b), 126 Stat. 1496, 
1499. 
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foreign policy should be and on what conditions it should be made, 
and could raise a separation of powers challenge.  
A second area of concern is at the end of the Magnitsky Act, 
where Congress orders the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the 
Treasury, members of the executive branch, to submit to Congress a 
report on “efforts by the executive branch to encourage the 
governments of other countries to impose sanctions that are similar to 
the sanctions imposed under this title.”128 In a manner similar to the 
previous concern, this provision implies that the executive branch 
must be making efforts to persuade other countries to impose certain 
sanctions, and as a result, some could argue that Congress 
overstepped the line by telling the President and the executive branch 
how to direct and create foreign policy, thereby disregarding the 
principle of separation of powers. Although these instances of 
separation of powers concerns may seem small or insignificant, they 
are important to mention when discussing the implications of the 
ability of Congress to direct foreign affairs through its passage of the 
Magnitsky Act.  
 
b.      Section 404(a) 
The Magnitsky Act also contains a section implicating 
separation of powers issues that are of greater concern; namely the 
requirement in §404(a) that the President must exclude certain 
Russian people because of the fact that Congress did not like what 
happened to Sergei Magnitsky. This section provides in part: “Not 
later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
list of each person who the President determines, based on credible 
information—(1) is responsible for the detention, abuse, or death of 
Sergei Magnitsky. . . .”129 The bolded language indicates that the 
creation of such a list is not discretionary—it is a mandatory action 
that the President must take, as dictated by Congress. There is no 
other option. Although later on in §404(d) the President has the 
ability to remove a person from the list “if the President determines 
and reports to the appropriate congressional committees . . . that (1) 
credible information exists that the person did not engage in the 
 
128. Id. § 407(2). 
129. Id. § 404(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
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[alleged] activity; (2) the person has been prosecuted appropriately . . 
. or (3) the person has credibly demonstrated a significant change in 
behavior,” and/or somehow atoned for and renounced such activities, 
this does not change the fact that the President must still create a list 
of individuals to face mandatory sanctions by the United States, and 
cannot remove those individuals from the list except for the reasons 
set forth by Congress.130   
This provision implicates greater separation of powers concerns 
because it has the potential to raise considerable conflict between the 
executive and legislative branches. If the provision’s legitimacy were 
ever challenged in court, the judicial branch, upon deciding to hear 
the case, would have to determine on the merits whether the 
Magnitsky Act infringed upon the foreign affairs powers of the 
President. As stated previously, because the President has so few 
explicit powers, the case is not clear-cut. On one hand, as the Court in 
Henderson and the concurrence by Justice Alito in Zivotofsky stated, 
Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce also includes the 
right to regulate the entry of people into the United States.131 On the 
other hand, the President retains broad foreign affairs powers, and as 
pointed out in Curtiss-Wright, the President is “the sole organ of 
nation in its external relations.”132 Therefore, the Magnitsky Act 
implicates a serious conflict between the two branches of government 
in this specific area of foreign affairs, particularly if the President 
were to refuse to submit such a list. Should the President claim the 
power to create a list of individuals to face mandatory sanctions as 
his exclusive power, a legitimate separation of powers claim could 
arise; one which would have to be closely scrutinized by the Court. 
         CONCLUSION 
 Sergei Magnitsky’s abuse and death while in prison on false 
charges were deplorable, and the political nature of the crimes against 
him raise a large number of human rights concerns for those who 
oppose the Russian government. It is reasonable for countries to 
desire to impose some kind of legislation or obtain some measure of 
justice to ensure that this does not continue to ocvcur. However, the 
Magnitsky Act seeks to impose punitive measures on an area that 
Russia considers to be a purely domestic concern. Although Congress 
 
130. Id. § 404(d). 
131. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1436 (2012) (Alito, J., 
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appears to have the power to pass this law, it does not necessarily 
make it an effective law. In some ways it simply replaces the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment and creates the same hostile feelings that 
the Russian government felt back in the 1970’s when the Amendment 
was first enacted.  
At the time of this note’s publication, instead of obtaining justice 
for Sergei Magnitsky and those who have suffered human rights 
violations, the Act has just inflamed tensions between two 
governments with an already unstable relationship, provoking a back-
and-forth legislative game to the detriment of both countries. For 
example, in the two years since this paper was first drafted, several 
major events have occurred that have placed Russia and the United 
States directly at odds against each other. First, as mentioned 
previously, the Edward Snowden incident occurred,133 followed by 
the crisis and debate over intervention in Syria, cancelled bilateral 
negotiations, and a scathing op-ed written by Putin.134 Most recently, 
a series of aggressions between the two countries erupted over the 
crisis in the Ukraine and Russia’s subsequent intervention, ultimately 
resulting in a second round of Magnitsky-like sanctions by the United 
States on leading Russian figures and institutions.135 These tensions 
have yet to lessen.136  
 
133. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
135. Interestingly, William Browder weighed in on the sanctions resulting 
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(Mar. 3, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp 
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go-after-the-russian-elites-assets/. 
136. In fact, U.S. officials are considering adding additional sanctions to those 
already in place, due to the Pentagon’s report that a Russian attack aircraft made 12 
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For these reasons, it would appear that the Magnitsky Act is 
more detrimental than beneficial to American foreign relations. 
Perhaps it would be better for the U.S. and the international 
community to use other mediums through which they can hold Russia 
accountable for Magnitsky’s death, such as human rights treaties 
Russia has signed and the international court system. In this way, the 
United States can seek justice for Sergei Magnitsky, while still 
attempting to repair its tenuous relationship with the Russian 
Federation. 
 
 
